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EXTENDING THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: ENFORCING DATA QUALITY
IN NATIONAL SECURITY DATABASES
AND WATCH LISTS
CHRISTINE M. WHALLEY*

Since its inception, the exclusionary rule has been aimed at deterring
misconduct by police officers and law enforcement agents. It is widely
believed to deter deliberate, reckless, grossly, or systemic negligent conduct by law enforcement agents. Increased reliance by law enforcement
agencies and their agents on expansive, interconnected information suggests that the exclusionary rule needs to be expanded beyond just the acts
of the officers and agents and be applied to the agency itself, where there
is evidence that poor data quality standards produced the reckless or
negligent conduct. When so much of our liberty rests on the quality of
the data in these databases and watch lists, it is irresponsible to allow
such systems to be exempt from legislatively mandated data quality
standards. The government must endure the sanction imposed upon it
under the exclusionary rule – for it is a constraint on the power of the
government, not just some of its agents, to preserve the fundamental protection under the Fourth Amendment to be secure in our persons, homes,
papers, and effects. This article explores the current framework within
which data quality of criminal records and national security watch lists
are maintained and how extending the exclusionary rule to the underlying systems of information on which the law enforcement agencies and
their agents so heavily rely can increase the data quality of these
systems.

* Juris Doctorate (2010), Pace University School of Law, with more than 20 years of
experience in Information Security. I may be contacted at christine@whalley.org. I gratefully acknowledge the patience and support of Ian Whalley, when it appeared the law library was my new home and I finished this article during our holiday in the Orkney
Islands. I also gratefully acknowledge the encouragement and support from Mark R. Shulman, Marie Stefanini Newman, and Bridget J. Crawford as I undertook this endeavor. In
addition, I appreciate the assistance from the entire editorial team at the Journal of Computer and Information Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What happens when you are about to embark on a business trip only
to discover that you are listed on the “No Fly List” and are unable to
board your flight?1 What do you do when you are stopped for a traffic
violation and suddenly find yourself being arrested because the police
officer has received information that there is an outstanding warrant for
you?2 What do you do when you find that you are being whisked away to
a foreign country for interrogation because you are incorrectly suspected
of being a terrorist?3
Too often the knowledge of such erroneous information only comes
when one is at the wrong end of the situation and one’s liberty, reputation, person, house, papers, or effects have been violated. In the situations described above, would the average person know what actions to
take to have the information corrected, who should be responsible for
making the corrections, and how to ensure that the corrections were indeed made in a timely fashion? Particularly, after September 11, 2001,
there has been a concerted effort by the government and various agencies within the United States government to create an “information sharing environment”4 that accumulates data on persons and entities. This
data then provides the basis for terrorist watch lists, no-fly lists, criminal records, and other data that is used by law enforcement and various
agencies in support of national security.
The government has faced increasing pressure to improve its collection and use of information in order to be more vigilant against terrorists
and their activities. The lack of information and the government’s failure to share such information was cited as the “single greatest failure of
our government”5 leading up to the 2001 attacks on the United States.
While accumulating and sharing this information may provide protection to our nation, it is vital that the government also ensure the quality
of the cascading information it shares in order to preserve our fundamental protections under the Constitution to be secure against unreasonable
1. Story regarding a colleague of the author who discovered that a variation of his
name was on the “No Fly List” maintained by the Transportation Security Agency. See also
Leslie Miller, House Transportation Panel Chairman Latest to be Stuck on No-Fly List,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 29, 2004; Joe Sharkey, Not too Small to Appear on a Big No-Fly
List, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/business/
30road.html?_r=2&oref=slogin.
2. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
3. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d. Cir. 2008).
4. Exec. Order No. 13,388, 70 Fed. Reg. 62023 (Oct. 25, 2005).
5. Federal Support for Homeland Security Information Sharing: Role of Information
Sharing Program Manager: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Intelligence Information
Sharing and Risk Assessment of the House Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 23
(2005) (statement by Lee Hamilton, Vice Chairman, 9/11 Public Discourse Project).

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-2\SFT203.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 3

17-JUN-10

EXTENDING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

9:55

259

searches and seizures of our persons, houses, papers, and effects6 and to
not be deprived of our life, liberty, or property without due process.7 In
the 2009 decision Herring v. United States, Chief Justice Roberts writing
for the majority held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule even applied to situations where negligent police recordkeeping resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure.8 This exception to the exclusionary rule substantially reduces any remaining motivation the
government has for ensuring data quality as it gives the government,
through its law enforcement agents, unfettered permission to use incorrect information, albeit in good faith, to obtain faulty warrants, to perform unreasonable searches and seizures, and to interfere with one’s
liberty without instilling any incentive to correct the underlying system
of information on which these actions are based.
This article explores some of the critical issues surrounding the government’s use of information and the data quality standards that are
applied. In particular, this article focuses on the failure of the government and the legal system to adequately address the quality of data that
it cascades and shares in pursuit of national security. This article will
illustrate how other motivations to ensure data quality such as redress,
statutory compulsion, internal audit, and mission-related activities do
not seem to be effective as they can be waived, repeatedly violated, and
oft ignored. Section II surveys various watch lists and databases, the
current state of their data quality, and the methods employed for ensuring data quality. Section III reviews the legislation on data quality and
privacy protections and its failure to adequately assign responsibility
and enforcement for data quality. Section IV examines the Supreme
Court’s holding in Herring and its impact on data quality standards.
Section V offers recommendations for assigning responsibility and enforcing data quality standards for information used to support national
security. These recommendations attempt to strike a balance between
the need to leverage watch lists and databases to share information on
national security issues while protecting our fundamental protections
guaranteed under the Constitution.
II. WATCH LISTS AND THE QUALITY OF DATA
Once information is placed in an electronic database or other information system, the human tendency is to accept the accuracy of that in-

6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. U.S. CONST. amend V.
8. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702-04 (2009).
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formation without question.9 This phenomenon is not limited to
electronic databases; it can be observed in our willingness to believe
print sources on their face as well.
Because this article focuses on the responsibility for data quality, a
definition of data quality and what it entails is a logical starting point.
Data quality has been defined according to three key terms: “objectivity,”
“utility,” and “integrity.”10
“Objectivity. . . ensures disseminated information, as a matter of substance and presentation, is accurate, reliable, and unbiased.”11
“Utility requires that the “usefulness of the information” is assessed.
This assessment includes “continuously monitoring information needs
and developing new information sources or revising existing methods,
models, and information products where appropriate.”12
“Integrity. . . ensures information is protected from unauthorized access, corruption, or revision.”13

Those charged with managing information must put policy, process,
and tools in place to control and monitor the data quality.

Figure 1: Model depicting the elements of the taxonomy of
privacy as described by Solove.14
9. P. STEPHEN GIDIERE III, THE FEDERAL INFORMATION MANUAL, HOW THE GOVERNCOLLECTS, MANAGES, AND DISCLOSES INFORMATION UNDER FOIA AND OTHER STATUTES
176 (2006).
10. PATRICE MCDERMOTT, WHO NEEDS TO KNOW? THE STATE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 239 (2007).
11. United States Department of Justice, Department of Justice Information Quality
Guidelines, http://www.usdoj.gov/iqpr/dojinformationqualityguidelines.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2009).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. DANIEL J SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 104 (2008). Figure 1 is taken in its
entirety from Solove’s Understanding Privacy.

MENT
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As shown in Figure 1, “[t]he general progression from information
collection to processing to dissemination is the data moving further away
from the individual’s control.”15 Therefore, it seems inappropriate to put
the onus on the data subject or person to ensure that the information
collected, processed, and disseminated about them remains accurate.
This duty, as illustrated in Figure 1, centers on the data holders – those
that can directly control the data quality. As Edward Deming observed,
“[eighty-five percent] 85% of poor quality is directly attributable to the
manufacturing process and only [fifteen percent] 15% to the [individual]
worker” producing a product.16 It is, therefore, reasonable to believe
that the processes used to collect, process, and disseminate (“manufacture”) information, as illustrated in Figure 1, are where the majority of
the data quality errors are introduced.
A. WATCH LISTS

AND

DATABASES

As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, a “watch list” is “a compilation of items or names that require close surveillance, especially for
legal or political reasons.”17 Watch lists maintained by the government
address a wide range of categories and have broad impact on the lives of
individuals contained in the lists, including whether they can travel via
airplane, obtain employment, and the like. Table 1, shown below, provides a summary of some of the watch lists maintained by federal agencies in support of national security.
B. DATA QUALITY

OF THE

WATCH LISTS

In May 2009, the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) for the Department of Justice released the findings of its audit on the nomination process for the Terrorist Watch List18 maintained by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”). This particular watch list was established to “develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have
been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or
related to terrorism.”19
15. Id. at 103.
16. RANJIT K. ROY, A PRIMER ON THE TAGUCHI METHOD 8 (1990).
17. SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3589 (5th ed. 2002).
18. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6: Directive on Integration and Use of
Screening Information to Protect against Terrorism, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1234
(Sept. 16, 2003). The Terrorist Watch List was established through the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6, issued by President George W. Bush in 2003. Id.
19. Id.
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Agency

List

Purposes

Further Background

Bureau of Consular Affairs

Consular Lookout & Support
System

Vetting foreign
nationals seeking visas

Receives information from
TIPOFF

Bureau of Intelligence and
Research

TIPOFF

Tracking
known and suspected international terrorists

Created in
1987, transferred to Terrorist Threat
Integration
Center (TTIC)
in 2003 and
then to the National
Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) in
2004, which
now maintains
the Terrorist
Identities
Datamart Environment watch
list for international terrorists

Interagency
Border Inspection System

Primary
database for
border management and Customs law enforcement

Part of Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS)

No Fly List

Identify threats
to civil aviation

Names added
by FBI case
agents and
NCTC analysts

Selectee List

Selecting passengers for additional screening

Provided to airlines on a daily
basis

National Automated Immigration Lookout System

Biographical
and case date
for aliens who
may be inadmissible in US

Created originally by [Immigration and
Nationalization
Service] INS,
now absorbed
into [Department of Homeland Security]
DHS systems
in 2005, also
housed in
TECS

Automated Biometric Identification System

Tracking aliens
entering US illegally or suspected of
crimes

Created by
INS, transferred to DHS
in 2003

Homeland U.S. Customs
Security
and Border
Protection

Transportation
Security Agency (TSA)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
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U.S. Marshals
Service

Warrant Information Network

Tracking persons with existing federal
warrants

Does not perform any independent watch
list function regarding terrorism

FBI

Violent Gang
and Terrorist
Organization
File

Tracking individuals associated with
gangs and terrorist organizations

Created in
1995 as a component of the
National Crime
Information
Center [NCIC]

Integrated Automated Fingerprint ID
System [IAFIS]

National fingerprint and
criminal history database

Supplies biometric identifying information
to support other watch lists

Interpol Terrorism Watch List

Assistance for
global police
operations

Created in
2002; contains
about 100
names also in
other watch
lists

Retrieving Air
Force fugitives

Performs no independent terrorist watch
list function

U.S. National
Central Bureau
of Interpol

Defense

unknown

Air Force Office Top 10 Fugitive
of Special InList
vestigations

Table 1: Summary of Some Watch Lists Maintained by
Federal Agencies.20
“This list is primarily used by frontline screening personnel at U.S.
points of entry and by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement.”21
The May 2009 audit report is a report of the audit performed in March
2008 where the OIG determined “that the initial watch list nominations
created by FBI field offices often contained inaccuracies or were incomplete” and “that the FBI did not consistently update or remove watch list
records, when appropriate.”22
As of September 2008, it was estimated that there were more than
400,000 unique individuals on the Terrorist Watch List.23 This report
makes note of several data quality issues related to the Terrorist Watch
List.
20. Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 804, 813 tbl.1 (2007). Table 1 was taken in its entirety from Shane’s article.
21. U.S. DEPART. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT DIVISION, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES, AUDIT REPORT 09-25, i (May 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.
pdf [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT].
22. Id. at ii.
23. Id. at ii n.4.
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In [sixty-seven] 67 percent of the cases where a watch list record modification was necessary, the FBI failed to modify the watch list record
when new identifying information was obtained during the course of the
investigation, as required by FBI policy.24
In [seventy-two] 72 percent of the closed cases reviewed, the FBI failed
to remove the subject in a timely manner.25

Some of these errors introduce risk to national security, but they
also introduce situations where the individuals whose data is incorrect or
who have not been appropriately removed from the watch list are
delayed or inconvenienced. In the report, the OIG notes that nearly fifteen percent of the individuals who should have been removed from the
watch list were unnecessarily delayed by frontline personnel more than
six times.26
Interestingly, even though these individuals could have filed a redress27 complaint through the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program28 (“TRIP”), none of them had
done so as of September 2008.29 DHS TRIP allows individuals to seek
some form of relief from being stopped unnecessarily or misidentified as
a result of a watch listing.30 Requests received through TRIP are routed
for redress to the appropriate DHS components.31 The appropriate department reviews the request and reaches a determination about an individual’s status.32 If redress is granted, the results are recorded in
another system to allow the airlines to prevent future delays for misidentified individuals until the watch list is corrected.33
C. METHODS

FOR

ENSURING DATA QUALITY

While inspection is a good tool in monitoring the quality of the information in the various watch lists and databases, “no amount of inspection can put quality back into [a] product – it is merely treating a
24. Id. at iv.
25. Id. at iv-v.
26. Id. at 41.
27. Redress is a process by which the affected party can request to have data corrected,
updated, or removed and, in some cases, can request damages for the harm caused by the
misinformation.
28. Transportation Security Administration, DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program,
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/customer/redress/index.shtm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009)
[hereinafter TSA]. The form to submit for inquiry and redress is available at, http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHSTRIP_Traveler_Inquiry_Form.pdf, (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
29. AUDIT REPORT, supra note 21, at 41.
30. TSA, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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symptom.”34 Even though the results in the 2009 OIG audit are somewhat improved over the results from the 2008 audit,35 there are still numerous data quality issues. It is a generally held principle in quality
management that quality cannot be improved simply by inspection;36
therefore, it is unlikely that audits and inspections alone will improve
the quality of the data in watch lists and national security databases. It
will require both inspections and a concerted effort during the front end
of the data collection and processing to ensure continued quality of the
data.
There are no published criteria for including an individual on a
watch list.37 This lack of criteria also means there is no prior notice as to
when or why someone is added to a watch list38 and there is no opportunity to challenge the inclusion.39 The first time an individual knows that
he or she is on a watch list is when they are denied some privilege, such
as airline travel. This places the emphasis on the individual rather than
the data holder to identify the data quality issue and have it corrected.
Once an individual attempts to correct false or inaccurate information, the processes available to the individual require him to know the
information holder who included the information initially so the error
can be corrected at its source. However, since the information in these
systems does not contain attribution,40 or rather a full history of where
the information was obtained or entered into the system, the ability to
correct the information at the right location and ensure it cascades to all
constituent databases is difficult at best. It is particularly onerous for
the individual that has little to no insight into the process by which the
information was included.
III. LEGISLATIVE POSTURE FOR DATA QUALITY OF
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
As Solove noted in his book, Understanding Privacy, information
maintained by the government can be used to make important decisions
about people’s lives.41 The individual whose life can be shaped by this
information has scant knowledge of how the information has been col34. ROY, supra note 16, at 8-9.
35. AUDIT REPORT, supra note 21.
36. ROY, supra note 16, at 8-9.
37. Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists,
30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 65, 81 (2006).
38. Id. at 96.
39. Id. at 93.
40. Paul Rosenzweig & Jeff Jonas, Correcting False Positives: Redress and the Watch
List Conundrum, 17 LEGAL MEMORANDUM, June 17, 2005, at 11-12, available at https://
www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/8408/lm_17.pdf.
41. SOLOVE, supra note14, at 182.
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lected, processed, and used, and this information is unfortunately often
subjected to a bureaucratic process that lacks discipline and control.42
There are several laws to provide access to this information and to provide mechanisms to ensure the quality of this information. It is the implementation of these laws where the challenge seems to lie.43 The
following is a summary of those laws and some of the drawbacks in their
implementation as it relates to monitoring and enforcing quality in
watch lists and national security information as it applies to the
individual.
A. PRIVACY ACT
Around the world there are various rights for people to access and
correct their records – whether they are governmental records, health
records, personnel records, or the like.44 Providing such mechanisms
can be costly and time consuming, but failure to do so can erode accountability on the part of government agencies and businesses that maintain
records about individuals.45 The Privacy Act of 197446 generally allows
a United States citizen to gain access to most personal information maintained by Federal agencies and to be able to correct any inaccurate, incomplete, untimely, or irrelevant information.47 The Privacy Act does
not apply to every record for an individual,48 but rather the Act only
applies to those records held by an “agency,” as defined by the Act.49
Therefore, the records held by courts, executive components, or nonagency governmental entities are not subject to the provisions in the Privacy Act. An individual has no right to these records, or at least no right
protected by Congressional statute.50 While the Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act of 198851 amended the Privacy Act by adding
certain protections for subjects of Privacy Act records whose records are
used in automated matching programs, it did not expand the protections
42. Id.
43. MCDERMOTT, supra note 10, at 255.
44. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C § 522 (2004) (U.S.); The Freedom of Information Act, 1989, AUST. CAP. TERR. LAWS 46, (Austl.), available at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/alt_a1989-46co/default.asp.
45. SOLOVE, supra note14, at 134.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
47. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE ON USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 TO REQUEST GOVERNMENT RECORDS, H.R. REP. NO.
108-172 (2005), at 25, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/citizen.pdf [hereinafter CITIZEN’S GUIDE].
48. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2004).
49. Id.
50. See Dale v. Executive Office of the President, 164 F. Supp. 2d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2001).
51. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2004).
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to all of the places those electronic records were shared as part of automated matching programs.
To initiate a Privacy Act request, the requester must identify either
the specific system of records or the agency responsible for the records
the requester wishes to obtain.52 Each agency provides details on how to
request records under the Privacy Act. The requester must then write a
letter requesting the information.53 The letter must contain: 1) a statement that the request is being made under the Privacy Act provisions; 2)
the name, address, and signature of the requester; and 3) a description of
the records being requested.54 This first letter is needed to obtain access
to the records.55 A second letter is needed to make corrections to the
record.56 Again, the letter requesting the correction will normally be
sent to the agency that maintains the record in question.57 The letter to
request a correction to a record must: 1) request a record to be amended
under the provisions of the Privacy Act; 2) identify the specific record
and specific information in the record to be corrected; 3) state why the
information is incorrect, untimely, irrelevant, or incomplete; 4) identify
any new or additional information that should be included in place of the
erroneous information; and 5) provide the name, address, and telephone
number of the requester.58 While the Internet has improved access to
information on the request process, it is still a very cumbersome process
for the individual to identify the appropriate system of record and to submit the request to the appropriate agency.
Once the request is submitted, the Privacy Act provides time limits
that should be met when responding to a request, providing notification
to the requester, and formalizing an appeal process.59 However, there is
an exception whereby the agency can determine its own timeline for actually making a correction if one is deemed appropriate.60
The Privacy Act has two general exemptions: 1) all records maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency and 2) selected records maintained to support criminal law enforcement.61 There are three types of
criminal law enforcement records that are exempt.62 Specifically, one
type is information compiled regarding the criminal history of an individ52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 47, at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 47, at 31-32.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6).
GIDIERE, supra note 9, at 66.
CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 47, at 28.
Id.
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ual.63 In addition to the general exemptions, the Privacy Act provides
for seven specific exemptions.64 One of these exemptions in particular
expands upon the law enforcement general exemption by providing exemption for records containing investigative material used by law enforcement for purposes other than those covered by the general
exemption.65 This specific exemption is limited, however, and disclosure
of the records is required if, as a result of the record, an individual would
be denied any right, privilege, or benefit to which he or she would be
entitled under Federal law.66 Such exemptions make the Privacy Act
virtually irrelevant for allowing the individual to monitor information on
his or her criminal record and to make corrections if appropriate.
B. FREEDOM

OF

INFORMATION ACT

The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)67 provides that any person
has the right to request access to federal agency records of information.
The Act requires all agencies of the Executive Branch to disclose records
when a written request is received unless the information requested is
one of nine categories of records that are exempt.68 There is no central
department or office that responds to all information requests; instead,
each agency has its own office to respond to requests for its own
records.69 This requires the person making the request to know which
agency has the records in question and that agency’s process for requesting those records.70 In addition, the requester may have to pay a fee for
the processing of the request.71 If the request is for personal information
regarding the requester, the requester will either be asked to supply a
notarized statement authorizing the release of the information or a
statement, signed under penalty of perjury, that the requester is who he
says he is.72 In some cases, a Privacy Act request may return more information than a FOIA request.73 Generally, FOIA requests must be
63. Id.
64. Id. at 29-30.
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id.
67. 5 U.S.C § 522.
68. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REFERENCE GUIDE (2006), http://
www.justice.gov/oip/referenceguidemay99.htm [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE].
69. Id.
70. However, a requester who does not know which specific agency holds the records
may be provided with a government directory and may make a request to multiple agencies. CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 47, at 9.
71. CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 47, at 11.
72. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 68.
73. Id.
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processed in a specific timeframe, currently twenty days,74 but depending on the scope and complexity of the request, the agency can provide an
alternate timeframe.75
As mentioned, there are nine statutory exemptions to FOIA.76 This
includes an exemption for law enforcement that “allows agencies to withhold law enforcement records in order to protect the law enforcement
process”77 and procedures if the disclosure of such information would
reasonably risk circumvention of the law, interfere with an investigation,
or endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.78 This generally
means that any information related to a person’s current status in regard to law enforcement, such as outstanding warrants, criminal record,
and the like can be exempt from FOIA and Privacy Act requests at the
discretion of the agency in possession of those records. While the intent
of FOIA, and indeed the Privacy Act, is to provide access to government
information, it is difficult to fully comprehend the information sources79
and to make a meaningful request to the right agency for the right information in order to get the desired results.
C. INFORMATION QUALITY ACT
In 2000, Congress enacted the Data Quality Act80 to establish administrative mechanisms to allow “affected persons to seek and obtain
correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency.”81
The Data Quality Act82 requires the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) to issue government-wide guidelines for ensuring the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information, including specifically
statistical information, disseminated to the public by Federal agencies.83
As noted by the Department of Justice’s guidelines for ensuring data
quality, the guidelines are not a regulation and are not legally enforceable nor do the guidelines “create any legal rights or impose any legally
74. Id. This response requirement was enacted in the 1996 amendments to FOIA and
became effective in October 1997 – codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(6)(A)(i), as amended by Public
Law No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 47, at 18.
78. Id. at 18-19.
79. MCDERMOTT, supra note 10, at 256.
80. The Data Quality Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2000).
81. Id. at § 3516(b)(2)(B); see also GIDIERE, supra note 9, at 62.
82. 44 U.S.C. § 3516. The Data Quality Act was enacted as part of a rider in a spending bill so it was not given a name in the actual legislation. The Government Accountability Office calls it the Information Quality Act, while others call it the Data Quality Act.
83. Id. at § 3516(a).
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binding requirements or obligations on the agency or the public.”84 In
addition, the guidelines do not apply to information disseminated by “intra-or inter-agency use or sharing of government information.”85
Two federal courts have been provided with the opportunity to review claims under the Information Quality Act and both held that the
Act’s “broad directive does not provide a meaningful standard for court
review.”86 As compared to the Privacy Act’s correction capability that
allows for redress87 and allows a court to review an agency’s final decision,88 the Information Quality Act does not provide enough standards
by which to judge an agency’s decision or to determine if the plaintiff was
able to demonstrate standing. So, like the Privacy Act and FOIA, the
Data Quality Act does not provide adequate ability for an individual to
monitor and correct information that would be contained in watch list,
criminal record, or national security databases. In addition, the current
legislation does not provide adequate incentives for the government
agencies to maintain the quality of this data, because they are largely
exempted from the data quality and fair practices in information
standards.
D. FAIR, ACCURATE, SECURE, AND TIMELY (FAST) REDRESS ACT
OF 2009 – PENDING LEGISLATION
The House has introduced a bill, FAST Redress Act of 2009, to establish an appeal and redress process for individuals wrongly delayed or
prohibited from boarding a flight, or denied a right, benefit, or privilege.
89 If passed, this bill would establish the creation of a “Comprehensive
Cleared List” for individuals who were misidentified, completed an appeal and redress request, and permitted the use of their personally identifiable information to be shared between departmental entities.90 This
bill has passed the House and has been referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. According to the Congressional Bills Legislative Forecasts Current Congress, House Bill 559
has a fifty percent chance of passing the Senate Committee and a
twenty-five percent chance of passing the Senate Floor.91 BillCast92
84. See United States Department of Justice, Department of Justice Information Quality Guidelines, http://www.usdoj.gov/iqpr/dojinformationqualityguidelines.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2009).
85. Id.
86. GIDIERE, supra note 9, at 68.
87. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(C) & (g)(4).
88. GIDIERE, supra note 9, at 69.
89. FAST Redress Act of 2009, H.R. 559, 111th Cong. (2009).
90. Id.
91. Congressional Bills Legislative Forecasts is available through the BLCAST
database on LexisNexis.
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gives House Bill 559 a twenty-four percent chance of passing the Senate.
Unfortunately, even if passed, this bill is limited to terrorist watch lists
and does not provide redress for the other information exempted from
the Privacy Act and FOIA.
IV. TO EXCLUDE OR NOT TO EXCLUDE – IMPACT OF
HERRING ON DATA QUALITY
While the Fourth Amendment protects an individual from unreasonable searches and seizures,93 there are no specific provisions for what
happens to the evidence obtained under an unreasonable search or
seizure.94 The exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule that suppresses the introduction of illegally obtained evidence at a criminal
trial.95 The exclusionary rule is, therefore, intended to provide a mechanism to safeguard the protections in the Fourth Amendment by deterring misconduct on the part of law enforcement.96 Even so, the
exclusionary rule is not a guaranteed right in every unreasonable search
and only applies when the exclusion of the evidence would result in “appreciable deterrence.”97 As defined in Leon, the benefit of excluding the
evidence must outweigh the cost of letting potentially guilty people go
free.98
In Herring, the court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply
if the evidence obtained from a search was the result of isolated negligence.99 In Herring, the mistake made by the police was based on an
error in a database that showed Herring had an outstanding warrant,
which resulted in his arrest and search.100 The court determined that
since the police acted in good faith based on the information they had at
the time and the error was due to a data entry mistake by the county
warrant clerk, the exclusionary rule should not apply and the results of
the search should be admissible.101
The court in Herring, following the rule in Leon, focused on the use
of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent when mistakes were made in the
92. BillCast provides forecasts for legislation and is available through the BC database
on WestLaw.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
94. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.
95. Id.; see also Potter Stewart, The Roadmap to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1983).
96. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.
97. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S, 897, 909 (1984).
98. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
99. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698-99.
100. Id. at 698.
101. Id. at 698-04.
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databases that affected the arrest and search processes. The court, however, did not focus on the systemic nature of the errors in the underlying
information and whether it was prudent of law enforcement to rely exclusively upon that information. In this case, the error remained undetected in the system for over five months.102 In Herring, the court stated
that the exclusionary rule serves to “deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence”103 and the court did not feel the circumstances in Herring rose to
that level.104 However, it can be argued that, given the reportedly large
number of errors in the data on which law enforcement relies in the
criminal records and watch lists, these errors are systemic and reoccurring and demonstrate gross negligence on the part of the data holder. It
follows then that, without the exclusionary rule, there is no incentive for
the police or other data holders or data consumers to ensure that data is
accurate before they act upon it.
The court in Herring stated that if the police had been shown to be
reckless in maintaining a warrant system, the exclusionary rule would
“certainly be justified.”105 Taking this point further raises the question
of whether failing to ensure the accuracy of the data in the warrant system, by any of the actors responsible for its maintenance, would not also
be reckless, and therefore, the exclusionary rule would apply. This is
similar to the argument raised by the dissent in Herring in which Justice
Ginsburg, quoting the dissent in Arizona v. Evans, stated that the serious impact of the court’s decision in Herring will have on the innocent
people who are “wrongfully arrested based on erroneous information
[carelessly maintained] in a computer database.”106 Justice Ginsburg
further elaborated that the inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected repositories of information can raise concerns regarding individual liberty.107 Justice Ginsburg went on to state that the exclusionary rule can
be viewed as a way to provide a constraint on the power of the government, not just some of its agents.108 Instead of applying the multi-factor,
case-by-case test for police culpability that the court in Herring adopted,
Justice Ginsburg recommended the applying the exclusionary rule whenever law enforcement personnel is responsible for errors in databases
that result in a Fourth Amendment violation.109
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
Evans,
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 705.
Id. at 702.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens’ dissent in Arizona v.
514 U.S. 1, 22 (1995)).
Id. at 709.
Id. at 707. See also STEWART, supra note 95.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 711 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Unlike the majority opinion in Herring, Justice Ginsburg’s recommendation recognizes that, in this age of almost exclusive reliance on
information sharing, reckless and negligent actions of law enforcement
are not limited to its agents on the street but rather to the law enforcement system in its entirety. Officers and agents can indeed act in good
faith based on the information they are provided. However, when that
information is faulty, through no direct action of the officer on the street,
but rather through careless practices and systemic negligence, the resulting action is no less harmful to the rights of the individual than if the
officer had acted recklessly.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY
AND ENFORCEMENT FOR DATA QUALITY
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.110

As Solove noted, if government can promise confidentiality (and integrity) of data but suffer no consequences for violating its words, then
such promises become unreliable and erode the trust of the government
and the information.111 This need for trust is reiterated in Shane’s article where he states that when “the unjustified targeting of innocent persons becomes widespread, the very fabric of mutual confidence between
citizen and government. . . would be threatened.”112 To ensure the quality of data the government uses in support of national security will require a comprehensive program so that quality can be built into, and
maintained within, the national security databases and watch list
processes. This program will need to rely on people, process, and technology as has been outlined in other privacy protection legislation113 for
such areas as medical and banking information.
A. REDUCE EXEMPTIONS

FROM

LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS

As discussed in Section III, the legislative posture and protections
are somewhat weak or non-existent when it comes to enforcing data
quality on the criminal law enforcement and national security watch
lists and databases because these are exempt from the protections offered by the Privacy Act, FOIA, and the Data Quality Act. The prognosis
for House Bill 559 is not very good and even if passed would only provide
a redress capability after the harm is already done. To date, there are no
110. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
111. SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 182.
112. Shane, supra note 20, at 808.
113. Examples of this legislation include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act (GBLA), Pub. L.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA), Pub, P. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2021-2031 (1996).
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legislative protections that would provide an individual with the opportunity to monitor and correct information or misidentification before the
harm is realized. Additional legislation should be considered to either
amend the exemptions or provide specific access and correction capability for individuals to monitor the information contained about them in
national security databases and watch lists. This ability to monitor
could be limited to that information that would deny the individual a
right, benefit, or privilege so long as that information is not part of an
active investigation or would expose sensitive national security procedures. However, the government’s ability to claim such privilege would
need to be scrutinized.114 In addition, the legislation should include a
requirement to report to Congress on the state of the watch lists, like the
number of people on the lists, the criteria for inclusion on the lists, the
number who have challenged their inclusion, and the disposition of any
redress.115 This type of reporting would provide insight into the extent
of the redress issue and may suggest future enhancements to the data
quality for the watch list and other national security programs. As
Shane noted, “it ought to be viewed as intolerable in a democratic society
for large numbers of innocent people to be stigmatized by the government under a largely secret program, even if such cases can be redressed
through post-inclusion individual review.”116
B. INCREASED REQUIREMENTS

FOR

INTERNAL AGENCY CONTROLS

As previously noted, quality cannot be inspected into data. In addition to a recommendation to increase legislation to provide for accuracy,
accountability, and redress, internal agency controls must be enhanced
as well. Enhancements to the internal agency controls should include
both front-end controls to address data collection and processing as well
as back-end controls, such as redress, to handle situations where data is
incorrect. To date, much of the internal controls have been focused on
redress. While some redress programs, such as the one for the United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(“US_VISIT”), have been markedly successful,117 redress will only protect those individuals who become aware that they are listed.118
Providing controls on the processes to collect data and incorporate
that data into watch list and national security databases’ cascade of in114. This topic is too complex to cover in this paper. For coverage of the government’s
alleged misuse of the claim of privilege surrounding national security issues, see BARRY
SIEGEL, CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE: A MYSTERIOUS PLANE CRASH, A LANDMARK SUPREME COURT
CASE, AND THE RISE OF STATE SECRETS (2008).
115. Shane, supra note 20, at 854.
116. Id. at 809-10.
117. Id. at 847.
118. Id. at 821.
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formation is critical. These controls would help to ensure that the initial
data going into these systems was accurate at the outset. In addition,
internal quality controls will require regular sampling of records to determine whether the information has been accurately recorded and
whether the information is consistent about individuals as it is cascaded
to other systems or databases.119
In addition to the controls to ensure the accuracy of the information,
it is also important to monitor the integrity of the information to ensure
that no unauthorized modifications have been made. In Herring, it took
five months to determine that incorrect information was retained in the
database. It seems unlikely that there were processes in place to monitor unauthorized access or modifications to the records in the same
database. Implementing information security practices and audit trails
will help to identify responsibility for records and to provide traceability
of each record’s origin and modification during its lifecycle.
Another important element is training for the various parties that
interact with the watch lists and databases to ensure they are aware of,
and adhere to, defined quality controls throughout the information collection, processing, and dissemination processes as reflected in Solove’s
taxonomy.120 In interviews with case agents, who are the primary interface with the terrorist watch list nomination process, the OIG noted that
“some case agents did not consider watch list record removal to be a high
priority and they did not always understand the ramification of untimely
removals.”121 The audit report went on to conclude that “[s]ome case
agents did not appear to understand that the watch list is disseminated
to other organizations. Therefore, these case agents did not recognize
that the watch listed individuals or others with similar names could be
delayed, detained, or otherwise inconvenienced by law enforcement and
screening personnel.”122
C. EXCLUSION

OF

EVIDENCE

The exclusion of evidence is a powerful incentive to ensure that law
enforcement actions are handled appropriately. While the isolated error
referenced in Herring may not rise to the level of deterrence required by
the exclusionary rule, it is clear that the court in Herring has left the
door open to exclude evidence in situations where the errors were reckless, negligent, and systemic.123 Suggesting, as the courts have done in
prior exclusionary rule cases, such as Evans and Herring, that excluding
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 829.
SOLOVE, supra note 14.
AUDIT REPORT, supra note 21, at 42.
Id. at 42.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704.
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evidence would not deter the carelessness of other government entities,124 runs counter to the principles underlying negligence law.125
Given the data quality issues discussed in this article, it is recommended that evidence resulting from errors in watch lists and national
security databases should be excluded when the evidence is obtained
through violations of the Fourth Amendment. In addition to the recommended enhancements to legislative and internal controls, use of the exclusionary rule would go some way in providing a strong incentive to the
various data holders and data consumers to ensure the quality of the
data they manage throughout its lifecycle – from the information’s initial
collection and inclusion in a database to the removal of the information
when it is no longer valid or relevant. Such exclusions would fill the gap
when fair information practices noted in legislative requirements can be
exempted for law enforcement purposes. Further, such exclusions would
instill an incentive to the government agencies to maintain all the
records they use in making decisions about individuals with “accuracy,
relevance, timeliness, and completeness” in order to ensure fairness to
the individuals affected.126
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the idea that with great power comes great responsibility127 has become too cliché in our society and is oft misused. However,
in 1995, Justice O’Connor observed a similar concept in her concurring
opinion in Arizona v. Evans, “[i]n recent years we have witnessed the
advent of powerful, computer-based recordkeeping systems that facilitate arrests in ways that have never before been possible. . .With the
benefits of more efficient law enforcement mechanisms comes the burden
of corresponding constitutional responsibilities.”128 When so much of
our liberty rests on the quality of the data in the databases and watch
lists that the government uses for national security, it is irresponsible to
allow such systems to be exempt from legislatively mandated data quality standards and enforcement. While it offers some relief, being able to
correct an error in a database or watch list only after an innocent person
is drawn into an adverse event, such as being wrongfully arrested, detained, prevented from flying, or subjected to humiliating treatment, is
too little and too late.
124.
125.
126.
127.
2002).
128.

Id. at 704; Evans, 514 U.S. at 28-29.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) (2004).
Phrase used by character Benjamin Parker in SPIDERMAN (Columbia Pictures
Evans, 541 U.S. at 17-18.
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Given the increased technology and the state of information sharing
under the auspices of national security, perhaps this is the best and most
appropriate time to remind our government of its inherent responsibilities – to ensure the quality of the cascading information it shares in order to sustain the very protection of the citizens, residents, and visitors it
purports to serve. When the government fails to meet its responsibility
for ensuring this quality, simple redress for the error and the damages it
may cause is not enough. The government must endure the sanction imposed upon it under the exclusionary rule – for it is a constraint on the
power of the government as a whole and not just some of its agents129 to
preserve our fundamental protection under the Fourth Amendment to be
secure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects.
129. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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